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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
EDWIN F. RUSSELL,
Plm:'ntiff ,and Respondent,

vs.
GRANT L. VALENTINE,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
APPEAL FRO~£ THE JUDGMENT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY. HONORABLE
CHARLES G. COWLEY, DISTRICT JUDGE.
SAMUEL C. POWELL, and
D. JAY WILSON
David Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent

HANSON AND BALDWIN AND
MERLIN R. L YBBERT
515 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action under the Declaratory Judgment
Act by the Lessor, plaintiff, against the defendant, as an
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Assignee of a lease to interpret the terms of the lease and
to determine if the lease is terminated.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried in the District Court of Weber
County, Utah, before the Honorable Charles G. Cowley,
sitting without a jury. Judgment was rendered in favor
of the plaintiff.
ST'ATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Edwin F. Russell is now, and was in
the year 1950, the owner of a tract of land situate in Roy,
Weber County, Utah. On the 29th day of May, 1950,
Edwin F. Russell, as Lessor, entered into a written lease
agreement with Self-Service Enterprises, Inc. of Salt
Lake City, Utah, as Lessee, by which he leased said land
for a term of ten years, beginning on the 1st day of
June, 1950 (Exhibit 1).
Self-Service Enterprises, Inc., as Lessee, agreed to
pay $100.00 a month, in advance, on the first day of
each and every month, beginning the 1st of June, 1950,
as rental therefor.
The lease agreement contained a paragraph which
is paragraph 8 thereof, as follows:
"8. If the Lessee shall keep, observe and perform all of the terms and conditions of this lease,
on his part to be kept and performed, said Lessee
shall have the right to renew this lease for a further period, beginning as of the termination date
of this lease, provided he shall notify the Lessor
in writing thirty days prior to the terms of this
agreement that he desires such renewal and pro2
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vided, further, that he shall sign or offer to sign
a new lease upon the same terms and conditions
as are herein contained."
The defendant, Grant L. Valentine, is the assignee
of the lease, through successive assignments of said
lease, and has been in possession of the property described in the lease from the 30th day of October, 1954
(Exhibit 4).
The defendant, Grant L. Valentine, attempted to
renew the lease for a further period of ten years by giving the lessor written notice of his desire to renew such
lease, thirty days prior to the expiration date of May
31, 1960 (Exhibit 8).
The plaintiff filed this action under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, asking the Court to interpret said lease
and contending that the portion of Paragraph 8, which
refers to renewal, is vague, ambiguous, indefinite and
uncertain, and requesting the Court to enter judgment
that the lease was only for a ten year period and termi~
nated on the 31st of May, 1960. (R. 2 and 3).
The araft of the lease was prepared by Duane E.
Fuller, Secretary of Self-Service Enterprises, Inc., and
the final drawing of the same was made by Mr. C. N.
Ottosen, who was the attorney for Self-Service Enterprises, Inc. ('T .5). Duane E. Fuller, the Secretary and
Treasurer of Self-Service Enterprises, Inc. and Helmut
Moss, the President of the Self-Service Enterprises, Inc.
negotiated with the plaintiff, E~dwin F. Russell, for the
lease ( T .5). The negotiations extended over a period of
two or three weeks (T.6). The trial Julge found that
the provisions of Paragraph 8 referring to renewal were
3
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ambiguous, indefinite and uncertain and incapable of
enforcement, and that any extension, or renewal, beyond
~fay 31, 1960, would require negotiation and execution
of a new lease agreement between the parties (R.22).
The Court further found that the lease was for a period
of ten years and terminated on May 31, 1960. (R.22).
ST.ATE~1ENT

OF POINTS

POINT I
THE T'RIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT
THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE LEASE, DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT I, REFERRING TO RENEWAL
THEREOF, WERE AMBIGUOUS, INDE FINITE AND UNCERTAIN AND INCAPABLE OF ENFORCEMENT.
1

POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMI'T'TING PAROL
TESTIMONY TO EXPLAIN OR INTERPRET THE TERMS
OF THE WRITTEN LEASE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT
THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 8 OF 'THE LEASE,
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT I, REFERRING 'TO RENEWAL
THEREOF, WERE AMBIGUOUS, INDEFINITE AND UNCERTAIN AND INCAPABLE OF ENFORCEMENT.

Respondent contends that the provision set
in the lease concerning the right of the Appellant
new the lease is ambiguous. The portion of the
which required interpretation by the trial court is
graph 8, which provides as follows:

forth
to release
para-

4
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'' 8. If the Lessee shall keep, observe and
perform all of the terms and conditions of this
lease, on his part to be kept and performed, said
Lessee shall have the right to renew this lease
for a further period beginning as of the termination date of this lease, provided he shall notify
the Lessor in writing thirty days prior to the
terms of this agreement that he desires such
renewal and provided, further, that he shall sign
or offer to sign a new lease upon the same terms
and conditions as are herein contained."
In determining whether this paragraph is ambiguous, the trial court was required to interpret the wording contained therein in relation to the right of renewal.
The language used is as follows:
" ... said Lessee shall have the right to renew this lease for a further period beginning as
of the termination date of this lease ... "
The Respondent contends that this clause is ambiguous
in that it does not set forth the particular period for
which a renewal would he granted. The fact that the
paragraph also contains a provision that the Lessee shall
notify the Lessor, in writing, thirty days prior to the
terms of the agreement that he desires a renewal, and
that he is willing to sign a new lease upon the same
terms and conditions, as therein contained, does not fix
the period for which the renewal is to be. The Respondent
contends that reference which is made to the same terms
and conditions apply to all other terms and conditions
of the lease, except the period of time of the original
lease. If it were the intent of the parties to the agreement to grant a renewal for the same period of time
which was referred to in the original term, it could have
5
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been simply stated in the paragraph providing for such
renewal. The crux of this whole law suit rests upon the
words "for a further period".
If Paragraph 8 had provided that the Lessee shall
have the right to renew this lease upon the same terms
and conditions, and the words "for a further period"
were not in the paragraph, this matter would not have
been litigated as it would have been clear that the intention of the parties was to renew it for an additional ten
year period.
The court after hearing the evidence offered at the
trial, concluded that this paragraph was ambiguous and
made a finding to such fact as follows :
''8. The court further finds that the provisions in Paragraph 8 of the Lease referring to
renewal thereof, are ambiguous, indefinite and
uncertain, and incapable of enforcement, and that
any extension, or renewal, beyond May 30, 1960,
would require negotiation and execution of a new
lease agreement by the parties." (R.22)
Respondent asserts that such finding of the Court
is amply supported in the law and by the evidence presented at the trial of this action.
In the case of Realty Corp. vs. Park Cent.r.al Valet,
297 NYS 40, it was held:
"That a clause in a lease for a term l\farch
1, 1933, to September 30, 1936, which provided for
a renewal for 'an additional term of ______ years'
was too indefinite and uncertain to constitute a
renewal, on the ground that the parties apparently intended that where the clauses in the printed
6
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form of the lease contained blanks, such clauses
were to be disregarded. The Court said that literally there could be no renewal for a period of
"years", it would eliminate seven months of the
original term of three years and seven months.''
The Court held in Metcalf A~~to Co. vs. Norton, 119
103, 109 Atl. 38'4, that the renewal clause of a lease
gave the Lessee the privilege to re-lease at the end of
the term for a term of years to be agreed upon at an
agreed rental, and states:
~Ie.

" ... that a contract to make or renew a lease
is of no legal effect if the premises to be leased,
or the term or rental, are to be determined by a
subsequent agreement of the parties."
In H award vs. Tomidch, 81 Miss. 703, 33 So. 493,
the Court held:
"That a provision 'with privilege of longer'
in a lease of premises for one year, is too vague
and uncertain to constitute a binding covenant for
a renewal, as there is no certain meaning in regard
to the term or the consideration for the renewal
lease."
The Court must determine the intention of the
parties to a lease where an indefinite phrase is used,
such as that which appears in the lease in the instant
case. The general rule is set forth in 17 C.J.S. 689, and
is stated as follows :
''The primary rule of construction is that
the Court must, if possible, ascertain and give
effect to the mutual intention of the parties, as of
the time the contract was made, so far as that
may be done without contravention of legal prin7
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ciples, statutes, or public policy."
17 C.J.S. at 695 continues:
"As a general rule the language of a contract,
in the case of ambiguity, should be interpreted
in the sense that the promisor knew, or had rea~
son to know, that the promisee understood it ....
A party to a contract generally will be held to
that understanding which he knew was in accordance with the understanding of the other party

"

.

In the case of Assignment of Rich Hardware Co.,
196 P. 454,456; 22 Ariz. 254, the rule is stated as follows:
"In other words, whatever is expected by one
party to a contract and known to be so expected
by the other, is to be deemed a part or condition of the contract."
The certainty that is required not to have ambiguity
in a contract is set forth in 32 Am. J ur. at page 806, as
follows:
"Like other contracts or agreements for a
lease, the provision for a renewal must be certain
in order to render it binding and enforceable.
Indefiniteness, vagueness, and uncertainty in the
terms of such provision will render it void unless
the parties, by their subsequent conduct or acts
supplement the covenant and thus remove an alleged uncertainty. The certainty that is required
is such as will enable a Court to determine what
has been agreed upon .... "
A contract is construed strictly against the one drawing it. The uncontradicted evidence before the Court is
that the lease was drafted by the original Lessee, SelfService Enterprises, Inc., through Duane E. Fuller, the
8
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Secretary of Self-Service Enterprises, Inc. Fuller was
served with a subpoena in this action by the plaintiff.
He testified that he had drafted the terms of this lease
prior to the final drawing of the same by Mr. C. N.
Ottosen, the Attorney for the Self-Service Enterprises,
Inc. (Tr. 5).
In the case of lJ!ifflin vs. Shikv, 77 Utah 190; 293
P. page 1; it was held that a strict construction must
be placed upon a contract against the one drawing it.
Likewise in the following cases the same rule was stated:
Smith vs. Burton, 4 Utah 2d 61; 286 P.2d 806
Read vs. Forced Underfiring Corp., 82 Utah
529 ; 26 p 2d 325
Penn Star Mining Co. vs. Lyman, 64 Utah
343; 231 P. 107
W ackerele vs. 111artt1'bd(()le (Idaho) 353 P.
2nd 782

In the case of Hawat'ian Equipment Co. vs. Etmco
Corp. 115 Utah 590 ; 207 P 2nd 794 at 800, this Court
held:
" ... where the language (of a contract) used
is susceptible to more than one interpretation,
it will be construed most strongly against the
person using it."

In the case of Contt"nental Bank & Trust Company
vs. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P 2d 773, which is cited by
the Appellant, Judge McDonough speaking for the Court
said that Bybee was both the Attorney and the party in
the action, who drafted the instrument and, therefore,
that such instrument must be construed strictly against
him.
9
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The reason for the rule is expressed in 17 C.J.S.,
Contracts, Section 324, page 751, as follows:
" ... a man is responsible for ambiguities in
his own expressions and has no right to induce
another to contract with him on the supposition
that his words mean one thing, while he hopes the
Court will adopt a construction by which they
would mean another thing more to his advantage."
The citation in 17 C.J.S. 751, further states:
''To the extent that a contract is susceptible
of two constructions by reason of doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of ambiguous language, it is to be construed most strongly or
strictly against the party by whom, or in whose
behalf, the contract was prepared or the ambiguous language was used, and liberally and most
strongly in favor of the party who is not the
author, and not responsible for the use, of the
language giving rise to the doubt or uncertainty."
The appellant argues that where there is uncertainty in a lease relating to a renewal, that the tenant is
favored and not the landlord and cites some law to sustain this. However, it appears from the above authorities
that this general rule has been tempered by the holdings
of this Court, and Respondent contends that the rule
that a contract is construed strictly against the one drawing it, far out-weighs any favorable interpretation that
might be made in behalf of the tenant under such circumstances.
At page 7 of Appellant's Brief references is made
to a general statement of the law concerning the word
"renew'' as stated in 32 Am. J ur. Respondent has no

10
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quarrel with this statement. If, as hereinbefore stated,
the Lessee was granted the right to renew the lease, Respondent would concede that it would be upon the same
terms and conditions there being no other qualifying
words as used in the present lease such as ''for a further period".
Such ruling was made in the case cited by the Appellant in Yom.an vs. Levine, 206 P. 2d 596, likewise the
Respondent has no quarrel with the statement cited by
the Appellant in C.J.S. Landlord and ·Tenant Section
71, at Page 619.
Respondent does dispute the statement, however,
made by the Appellant that in the present case, the renewal paragraph contains a general covenant to renew.
Appellant argues that Mr. Russell, the Lessor, knew
the language of the lease and read it before: signing, and
that if he were not satisfied with it: he was in a position
to change or refuse to sign it. It must be remembered
that Mr. Russell is not a lawyer; that he had negotiated
with Fuller, who was experienced in drawing leases (Tr.
11), concerning this lease; and he was relying upon what
had been said by Fuller to him; and the discussions that
they both had concerning the proposed lease prior to
the signing of the same.
In the case of Sta.rr vs. Holck, (Mich.) 28 N.W. 2d
289, cited by the Appellant, it appears that the Court
made its decision granting a renewal for a period of one
year upon the theory that the lease should be construed
favorably to the tenant. The rule of law that a strict construction must be given to an instrument against one

11
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who drafted it was not raised in this case.
In the case of Metcalf Auto Company vs. Norton,
119 Me. 103, 109 Atl. 384, it appears to the Respondent
that the Court went a long way in determining that the
Lessee was entitled to have an extension of two years
on the lease. The same is true of the case of Miller vs.
Clemons, 276 S.W. 2nd 650, 651 (Ky.).
In the case of Cuntmtngs vs. Rytting, 116 Utah 1,
207 P. 2d 804, where the term of the lease is for five years
with a five year option, Respondent agrees with the ruling in this case and has no argument against it.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING PAROL
T'ESTIMONY TO EXPLAIN OR INTERPRET THE TERMS
OF THE WRITTEN LEASE.

The trial court having determined that an ambiguity
existed in the lease, it was then faced with the necessity of determining the intention of the parties to the
original lease because of such ambiguity as used in Paragraph 8 of the lease. It was, therefore, necessary that
parol evidence be received by the Court to ascertain, if
possible, the intention of the parties.
The rule for the acceptance of parol evidence of a
written document is set forth in Penn St,ar Minimg Company vs. Lyman, et al., 64 Utah, 343; 231 P. 107 at 109
and 110:
".No doubt the rule is universal and inflexible that extrinsic evidence may not be admitted,
if its purpose or effect be to vary or to add to,
or to 1nodify in any rna terial respect, the terms

12
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of a written instrument. Upon the other hand,
the rule is just as extensive and as well established that, in case the language of a written
instrument is obscure, uncertain, or ambiguous,
so that the intention of the parties is left in
doubt by an inspection of the instrument alone,
extrinsic evidence, within well-recognized limits,
is always admissible to aid the court in arriving
at the true intention of the parties. After all,
it is the intention of the parties that constitutes
their contract, and it is such intention that the
courts aim to enforce. l\ioreover, unless the provisions of a contract are clearly independent,
distinct, and severable, all of the terms and provisions must be considered and construed together, in order to arrive at the intention of the
parties. In other words, the contract must be
considered and construed as a whole, and such
is the case, 'even if the separate parts are clear
and free from ambiguity.' 2 Page, Contracts,
Section 2038.
The general rule applicable to contracts, the language of which, is ambiguous or uncertain, is so clearly
and comprehensively stated in Salt Lake City vs. Smith
104 F. at page 462, 43 C.C.A. 642, that we take the liberty
of reproducing the statement in full:
" 'The purpose of a written contract is to
evidence the terms on which the minds of the
parties to it met when they made it, and the
ascertainment of those terms, and the sense in
which the parties to the agreement used them
when they agreed to them is the great desideratum and the true end of all contractual interpretation. The express terms of an agreement
may not be abrogated, nullified, or modified by
parol testimony; but, when their construction
13
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or extent is in question, the meaning of the terms
upon which the minds of the parties met when
they settled them, and their intention in using
them, must be ascertained, they must prevail in
the interpretation of the agreement, however
broad or narrow the words in which they are expressed. In the discovery of this meaning, the
intention, the situation of the parties, the facts
and circumstances which surrounded and necessarily influenced them when they made their
contract, the reasonableness of the respective
claims under it, and, above all, the subject-matter
of the agreement and the purpose of its execution, are always conducive to, and often as essential and controlling in, the true interpretation of
the contract as the mere words of its various
stipulations. These are rules for the construction
of contracts which commend themselves to
reason and are established by repeated decisions
of the courts, and they must not be permitted to
escape attention in the consideration of the contract which this case presents. Accumulator Co.
vs. Dubuque St. Ry. Co., 64 F. 70, 74, 12 C.C.A.
37, 41, 42, 27 U. S. App. 364, 372.'"
In the case of Salt Lake City vs. Smith, 104 Fed. Page
462, which was referred to in the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Pe:nn Star Mt"ntng Co. vs. Ly'l'tUJJn,
it was held:
''The fundamental inquiry in construing all
contracts is a discovery of the intention of the
parties. When this cannot he done with certainty
from the terms of the instrument - that is in
case the meaning of the terms is doubtful, debatable, or ambiguous - the true intention must
14
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be ascertained bv reference to the facts and circumstances prec~ding and accompanying the execution of the instrument.
"The purpose to be subserved by this rule
is to place the court, or the jury, in the position
of the parties at the time the contract was made,
so that the language used may be interpreted intelligently.
Hence, proof of facts which tend to illustrate
or explain the language used in the contract and
to place the court or jury as nearly as may be
in the situation of the parties at the time of contracting, is always admissible when the meaning
of the terms used is debatable."
This decision is supported by citations in 33 ALR
2d 979,980. The rationale of these decisions is spelled
out in 33 ALR 2d, at page 983, as follows :
"The reason for admitting parol evidence for
the purpose of explaining ambiguities is very obvious. There is a great deal of difference between
the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain
that which is written. In the former case, the
attempt is to clarify without denying. Parties,
through inadvertence or lack of trial or skill, or
merely by reason of the frailties of language, may
express their intention vaguely. In such instances
it would be a harsh rule were the court to adopt
and enforce that particular one of several possible interpretations which to the judicial mind,
and with entire disregard for the situation of the
parties, was indicated by the language chosen.
Of course, where a party seeks to deny the plain
import of a writing which reveals no uncertainty
in meaning, even when viewed in connection with
the circumstances of its making, the rule of sub-

15
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stantive law by which prior extrinsic matters are
merged in the writing prevents him from succeeding. But where he seeks merely to explain
that which is imperfectly expressed, the rule of
merger is not violated."
Further support to the rule that parole evidence
was necessary in this action is found in 48 ALR 2d at
1268, and is expressed in these words :
"Whenever the terms of a contract are susceptible of more than one interpretation, or an
ambiguity arises, or the extent and object of the
contract cannot be ascertained from the language
employed, parol evidence may he introduced to
show what was in the minds of the parties at the
time of making the contract and to determine the
object on which it was designed to operate."
Likewise this rule is stated in 20 Am. J ur. at 9991000 as follows:
"Whenever the terms of a contract are susceptible of more than one interpretation, or an
ambiguity arises, or the extent and object of
the contract cannot be ascertained from the language employed, parol evidence may be introduced to show what was in the minds of the parties
at the time of making the contract and to determine the object on which it was designed to operate. Testimony to explain ambiguous language
in a contract may not be excluded on the ground
that it is an effort to vary the terms of a written
contract by parol testimony. The ambiguity may
arise from words plain in themselves, hut uncertain when applied to the subject matter of the
contract, or from words which are uncertain in
their literal sense."
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It is also stated therein as follows:
''Testimony to explain ambiguous language
in a contract may not be excluded on the ground
that it is an effort to vary the terms of a contract
by parol testimony."
The same ruling is held in Brown vs. Markland, 16 Utah
360; Great Western Printt"ng Company vs. Belcher, 104
s.w. 894.
From the rule laid down in these authorities, which
unquestionably is the law, it was proper for the court
to admit testimony of Duane E. Fuller, the SecretaryTreasurer of Self-Service Enterprises, Inc. and of Edwin
F. Russell, the Respondent herein, to show what was in
the minds of the parties at the time of the making
of the lease, and to determine the object on which it was
designed to operate. It will be recalled that Mr. Fuller
testified that he carried on negotiations with the plaintiff in this action for a period of approximately two or
three weeks prior to the final execution of the lease.
('Tr. 6) In these negotiations Fuller tried to get Russell
to grant an option for the renewal of the lease for a full
ten year, or for a lesser term, but that the plaintiff refused to grant a renewal or extension of the lease for
a period of longer than the initial ten year period. (T;r.
10-11)
In Fuller's interpretation of the wording of the
paragraph concerning of the granting of a further period
of time, he stated that he had rough-drafted other leases
for the corporation; that if it were intended that there
should be a definite renewal period stated in the lease
for five or ten years, he would have written it into the
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" ... Q. Now, had you asked Mr. Russell for
an additional ten-year period of time~
''A. Yes, we asked him a couple or three times
for a ten-year option.

"Q. What was his

response~

"A. Well, he didn't want to give it.

"Q. vVell did he say he didn't want to give it.
" . . . A. Well, he objected. I remember he
said, 'you can't - You don't know what will happen in ten years.' I remember something like that.
I can't remember anything else."
It appears that C. N. Ottosen, the attorney for the
original Lessee was never present during any of the negotiations, such negotiations being carried on by Duane E.
Fuller, Secretary-Treasurer of the Company, and Helmut
Moss, the President, with Russell. It is a fair conclusion,
therefore, that whatever was put in the lease concerning
a renewal thereof, was because of the rough-draft
made by Fuller, or upon instructions from Fuller.
Edwin F. Russell, the Respondent in this action, in
negotiating with Moss and Fuller, when the matter was
discussed about the period of the lease, testified in the
following words:
"It wi11 be a ten-year lease or we cant' make a
deal." (Tr. 25),
and further in the testimony he stated as follows:
"And finally we made the agreement on the
ten-year lease. And we discussed about what might
happen at the end of the ten-year lease. If I was
willing - maybe I wouldn't be willing - maybe
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I wouldn't want to re-lease. If I did, then we would
write up a new lease for the period that we decided on." (Tr. 25)
Russell had nothing to do with the writing of the
Lease (Tr. 26).
From this testimony it becomes evident that the
original parties to this lease had no intention that a
second period of ten years was contemplated by the
Lessee as drawn.
The assignment of the original lease introduced as
defendant's Exhibit 6, between the Self-Service Enterprises, Inc. as the Assignor to Wilburn C. West, as Assignee of the original lease, shows that the original parties understood that the lease was only for a ten year
term. The wording of this assignment is as follows:
"TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto Wilburn
C. West and his assigns from the 13th day of
January, 1951, for and during all the rest and rem.ainder yet to come of and tn the term of ten
years menti·oned in said lease . .." (italics are
Respondent's)
It will be noted that thereafter the subsequent assignments did not have this qualification in them. The
original Assignee and subsequent assignees, cannot obtain
more under the assignments than that which was originally stated in the first assignment.
Almost without exception, the cases cited by the Appellant that parol evidence cannot be introduced to vary
the terms of written instruments, are based on cases in
which the trial courts found there was no ambiguity in
the documents asked to be construed.
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An example of this is the most recent case cited by
the Appellant P,ulsipher vs. Tolboe, 373 P.2d 360: (Utah
decided April :2, 1962)
''. . . Inasmuch as the language is clear and
unan1biguous, there is no basis for 'interpreting
it' by shmving what the intent or 'understanding'
of the defendant was by extraneous evidence."
r_rhis quotation is admitted in Appellant's Brief at page
17.
In Ephr,aim Theatre Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d
163, 321 P. 2d 221, cited by Appellant, the trial court
also found that:
"The parties here spelled out just how the
proceeds from the operation of a theater should
be applied ... The understanding thus expressed
is plain ... "
In the case of Jensen's Used Cars v. Rvce, 7 Utah 2d
276, 323 P. 2d 259 cited by the Appellant, the trial court
found that the defendant had signed a conditional sales
contract that contained clear, complete terms, including
the price, and the defendant admitted all of this, so that
there was no ambiguity.
In the case of llfathias v. JJiadsen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 261
P. 2d 952, the Court held that while the instrument was
very poorly drawn, that the intent of the parties could
be determined in what was expressed in the instrument.
In the case of Continental Bank and Trust Company
v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P. 2d 773, the law pertaining
to introduction of parol testimony is stated and is not in
conflict ·with what the Respondent contends in this case.
The question before the Court was whether the parties
21
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intended by the Agreement that the Respondent should
assume the obligation on a note held by the Continental
Bank and Trust Company, and the Court held that the
intent should be ascertained first from the four corners
of the instrument itself, second from other contemporaneous writing concerning the same subject matter, and
third from the extrinsic parol evidence of the intentions.

Wilson v. Ga.rdner, 10 Utah 2d 89, 348 P.2d 931,
there was a written contract entered into between the
plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the plaintiff was to
feed the defendant's cattle. Orally the parties made other
agreements. The question in this case was whether the
parties may orally modify an agreement in writing not
within the Statute of Frauds. It appears to the Respondent that this case is not in point with the instant case.
In the case of Oliver v. Nugen, 308 P. 2d 132 (Kan.)
it was held that an action upon a written contract tried
in the lower court by both parties upon the theory that the
contract is ambiguous, the appellants cannot change their
theory on appeal and proceed on the premise that the
written contract is free from ambiguity, and thereby
preclude the admission of oral testimony to determine
its meaning. The Court held that it is a judicial function
to interpret a written contract which is free from ambiguity and does not require oral testimony to determine its
meaning.
In the case of Washingto1't Fish and Oyst.er Company
v. G. B. Halferty a1'td Company, 269 P. 2d 806, the action
involved the interpretation of a contract for the outright
sale of canned salmon. The court held that the rule is
universal that the written contract itself must be re22
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sorted to as the source of authority for receiving parol
evidence. Respondent has no quarrel with this decision.
It is not often in a law suit that you have testimony
concerning the construction of a contract in which both
parties to the original agreement concur, at least in principle, as to its interpretation.
This evidence should carry great weight in arriving
at a decision in this case. The Respondent contends the
Appellant, as successor in interest of the original Lessee,
is bound by the testimony and interpretation of such
original Lessee which was his predecessor in interest.
CONCLUSION
Respondent, therefore, contends that the judgment
of the trial Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
SAMUEL C. POWELL and
D. JAY WILSON
614 David Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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